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This paper presents the perspectives of personnel involved in decision-making about devices in critical care. We use the concept of
‘‘sharp and blunt ends’’ of practice to describe the performance of health care professionals. The ‘‘sharp end’’ is physically and tem-
porally close to the system; the ‘‘blunt end’’ is removed from the system in time and space and yet aﬀects the system through indirect
inﬂuence on the sharp end. In this study, the sharp end is represented by the clinicians (nurses and doctors) and the blunt end by the
administrators and biomedical engineers. These subjects represent the professionals involved in the decision-making process for pur-
chasing biomedical equipment for the hospital. They were asked to ‘‘think aloud’’ while evaluating three error scenarios based on
real events. The responses were recorded and transcribed for analysis. The results show diﬀerences in interpretation of critical events
as a function of professional expertise. The clinicians (sharp-end practitioners) focused on clinical and human aspect of errors while
the biomedical engineers focused on device-related errors. The administrators focused on documentation and training. These diﬀer-
ent interpretations mean that the problems are represented diﬀerently by these groups of subjects, and these representations result in
variable decisions about devices. These results are discussed within a systems approach framework to help us assess the completeness
of the problem representations of the subjects, their awareness of critical events, and how these events would collectively contribute
to the occurrence of error.
 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Decision making; Devices; Critical care collaborative decision making; Patient safety; Individual/group expertise; Task analysis; Instit-
utional decision making1. Introduction
Since the invention of the stethoscope by Rene Laen-
nec in 1816 and the electrocardiogram by Einthoven in
1903, the use of technology in health care has grown
by leaps and bounds. However, with the rising costs of
health care and the magnitude of device-related medical
errors, it is becoming increasingly important to identify
guidelines for the purchase of biomedical equipment.1532-0464/$ - see front matter  2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jbi.2004.11.012
* Corresponding author. Fax: +1 212 305 3322.
E-mail address: archana.laxmisan@dbmi.columbia.edu (A. Laxmisan).There is increased interest in the application of theories
and methods from cognitive science in the analysis and
modeling of complex human activities [1]. It is only inev-
itable, therefore, that cognitive science makes its journey
should appear in the complex, dynamic world of critical
care decision making. The successful application of cog-
nitive science principles to medical decision making,
medical education, and medical expertise has spurred
its progress, helped by the growing awareness that both
theoretical and methodological approaches from cogni-
tive science can contribute to the management of medi-
cal errors [1,2]. Medical errors have received recent
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institutions following the medical error report from the
Institute of Medicine, which named it as the eighth lead-
ing cause of death in the US [3]. There are various types
of medical errors, including human errors, device-re-
lated errors, and errors that can be attributed to the so-
cial dynamics of interactions between people and
technology in a distributed cognitive system [4]. The dis-
tinction between each type is often blurred, as errors are
often multidimensional, with factors related to each of
the diﬀerent types of error contributing to its occurrence
[5]. Early research into medical device-related errors
showed that the errors in the use of equipment were
more frequent and had more severe consequences than
device malfunctions [6–8]. This in turn paved the way
for research into human factors engineering [9–11]. Such
research further suggested that even though hospital
professionals often allocated blame to the user, the sys-
tem and the device design are often the most important
contributing factors. It also found that blaming the user
is not an eﬀective approach and that appropriate user-
centered design of medical devices is a more eﬀective
means to preventing errors [10–12]. Furthermore, re-
search also suggests that health care professionals views
of error vary based on their training and role in the
organization, but this has never been directly studied,
leading to this research on the attitudes of healthcare
personnel to error [13]. Because the way device-use er-
rors are addressed and reduced in the real world often
depends on what the decision makers view as the cause
of the error, this paper ventures to look at how a profes-
sionals expertise and position in a health care organiza-
tion aﬀects his or her view of medical errors.2. Background and theoretical perspective
The paper is based on the premise that decisions
made by various personnel involved in the design, devel-
opment, and ultimately the purchase and use of biomed-
ical devices in any institution inﬂuences the outcome and
quality of health care provided. Understanding the pro-
cess by which these personnel make decisions provides a
formal way of creating a monitoring system for safety.
Reason describes fallible decisions made by designers
and high-level managerial decision makers as a basic po-
sit of the framework that he discusses as a general view
of accident causation in complex systems [5]:
‘‘This is not a question of allocating blame, but simply a
recognition of the fact that even in the best run organi-
zations a signiﬁcant number of inﬂuential decisions will
subsequently prove to be mistaken. This is a fact of life.
Fallible decisions are an inevitable part of the design
and management process. The question is not so much
how to prevent them from occurring, as how to ensurethat their adverse consequences are speedily detected
and recovered’’.
Some social psychologists describe the fundamental
attribution error as the tendency to blame bad outcomes
on players personal inadequacy rather than attributing
them to situational factors beyond their control [5,14].
Reason also uses the terms fundamental surprise and sit-
uational surprise, ﬁrst introduced by Lanir [15]. Funda-
mental surprise is the profound discrepancy between
ones perception of the world and the reality, while situ-
ational surprise is a localized event that requires the
solution of speciﬁc problems. Lanir compares the diﬀer-
ence between the two terms to that between ‘‘surprise’’
and ‘‘astonishment,’’ illustrating it with an anecdote
about the lexicographer Noah Webster. One day, Web-
ster came home to ﬁnd his wife in the arms of the butler.
‘‘You surprised me,’’ says his wife—to which Webster
replies, ‘‘And you have astonished me.’’ While Webster
experienced a fundamental surprise, his wife only expe-
rienced a situational surprise. The natural human ten-
dency is to consider fundamental errors as situational
ones and respond accordingly—this is called the funda-
mental surprise error. The recognition of such errors
illustrates the importance of seeing the ‘‘big picture’’
during the analysis of errors and to look beyond the
mere allocation of blame. An oft-ignored part of error
analysis is the recognition of the ‘‘world,’’ i.e., the con-
text in which the error occurs.
In this paper, we look at how diﬀerent personnel per-
ceive factors that contribute to errors that are farther
away from the error in space and time than the operator
end of the system.
When ascribing blame in an incident to ‘‘human er-
ror,’’ the implicated individual is at the sharp end of
the system [5,16]. In medicine, such individuals could
be the clinicians or technicians who are physically or
temporally close to the patient. Government regulators,
hospital administrators, nursing managers, and insur-
ance companies are at the systems blunt end, having
an eﬀect on safety by placing constraints on the prac-
titioners at the sharp end. According to Reason, it is
necessary to study the resources and constraints acting
on the blunt end to eﬀectively examine how these
would eventually aﬀect those who work at the sharp
end [5].
Reason also distinguishes between two types of er-
rors: active errors (whose eﬀects are felt immediately)
and latent errors (whose outcomes remain hidden or
dormant within the system) [5]. The active errors are
generally associated with the sharp end and the latent er-
rors are generally associated with the blunt end. In the
purchase of biomedical equipment, for instance, the pur-
chasers, administrators, and the biomedical engineers
(the blunt end) act on the suggestions of physicians
and the nurses (the sharp end). Keselman et al. [17] de-
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regarding the decision-making process for infusion
pump selection. They found that even though they were
able to identify the diﬀerent professionals and groups in-
volved in decision making, the ﬂow of information
among them was restricted [17]. They also identiﬁed
the importance of collaborative communication technol-
ogy that might be used to ease this process [17].
The concept of distributed cognition is used in this
study to understand medical error in the context of crit-
ical care. This concept not only deals with the study of
internal and external representations, but also deals with
the distribution and propagation of knowledge between
individuals and artifacts, as well as the transformations
sustained by structures when used by individuals and
artifacts. This new approach allows the study of cogni-
tive phenomenon that are not observable at the individ-
ual level, such as cooperative work and socially
distributed tasks such as those involved in health care,
the nature of which is generally ﬂuid and dynamic [1].
An important part of the ‘‘world’’ is the interaction be-
tween individuals. In health care, cognition is distrib-
uted across diﬀerent groups and it is generally
assumed that health care teams function in a collabora-
tive manner in order to deliver health care eﬃciently and
eﬀectively [18,19]. This type of collaboration requires
interaction, which has led to an increased focus on com-
munication and teamwork. The composition of the team
may represent diﬀerent groups with their own agendas.
For example, in an emergency room we may have a
medical team, a surgical team, medical nurses, and trau-
ma nurses working with the same patient at the same
time. The inherent beneﬁts and problems of such a situ-
ation are the same as with any example of divided la-
bor—the most important beneﬁt being an increased
eﬃcacy in terms of time and quality, and the most
important problem being summarized by the expres-
sion—‘‘the right hand is unaware of what the left does.’’
The composition of the team itself is dynamic, depend-
ing upon various factors like the time of the day and
the nature of the task involved. Information and cogni-
tion ﬂows across these individuals, groups, devices, and
the external world [18–20].
Ever since the Stone Age when people lived in caves
and hunted together in bands, humanity has understood
the importance of collaboration. Probably the most ele-
gant examples of intellectual collaboration can be found
in health care: the organization of health care providers
into groups of physicians, nurses, and other personnel
and the specialization within these groups. The intelli-
gence required to solve a particular problem is often dis-
tributed across multiple individuals. When the cognitive
load behind a task that requires collaboration for its
execution is relatively low, and the decision to be made
is easy, all members of the team have more or less equal
standing. However when the cognitive load is high, thecognition involved is usually distributed in a hierarchical
manner. Where such a hierarchy is ill-deﬁned, and mul-
tiple factors have to be considered, no single individual
or group can assume the mantle of leadership; various
groups with various levels of expertise that may or
may not overlap must confer before reaching a common
solution [19].
Zhang et al. [4] describe a taxonomy of medical errors
that is intended to classify diﬀerent medical errors cogni-
tively; associate these errors to the underlying cognitive
mechanisms that play a causative role in error produc-
tion; indicate and describe where, when, and why these
errors can or will occur; and generate strategies for
intervention. However, their work approaches medical
error from the perspective of human errors. It is based
on the premise that any recognized error can be traced
to the actions of an individual or groups of individuals
under speciﬁc situations. Malhotra et al. [21], on the
other hand, explore the contribution of medical device
design to errors and how current safety principles can
be improved through better engineering. They discusses
the use of cognitive techniques to study error scenarios
in the critical care setting and builds relationships be-
tween the device and various medical error causing enti-
ties. The errors and their relationships were then
qualiﬁed on the basis of their modiﬁability. The possibil-
ity of including safety features to counter these modiﬁ-
able errors by engineering them into the device
domain itself was explored and consequently these
authors recommended modiﬁcations to the device de-
sign cycle. However, even if an intelligent medical error
reporting system with the capacity to predict error was
created on the basis of factors related to individual cog-
nition, or even if a ‘‘perfect’’ medical device could cre-
ated, medical errors would still occur. Therefore
interventions based on these premises, as commendable
and necessary as they are, would not be complete with-
out adequate attention to the nature of the system in
which these errors could occur. Our current paper
not only aims to compare the perception of key players
in the decision-making process in the selection of bio-
medical devices, but also provides possible interpreta-
tions about how people with diﬀerent backgrounds
and expertise process information diﬀerently to make
decisions.3. Methodology
3.1. Subjects
An earlier study revealed that the groups involved in
decision making about device purchase were primarily
composed of the following hospital workers: administra-
tors, biomedical engineers, nurses, and physicians [17].
Based on this data, we selected nine subjects as a repre-
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and administrative decisions about the purchasing of
medical devices for the hospital. These were two physi-
cians (an anesthesiologist/critical care specialist and an
anesthesiology resident), a physicians assistant, two
critical care nurses, two biomedical engineers, and two
administrators.
3.2. Scenarios
A sample of scenarios was chosen based on examples
adapted from the Food and Drug Administrations
(FDAs) medical device report ﬁles and based on the
FDAs ‘‘Do It By Design-An Introduction To Human
Factors In Medical Devices’’ [12]. The major protago-
nist in each of three selected scenarios was a diﬀerent
type of a professional representing a possible problem
with a medical device interaction. A clinical consultant
assisted our team in choosing the scenarios by evaluat-
ing their adequacy and appropriateness for meeting
our studys goals.
A brief summary of each scenario is outlined below.
The full scenarios, as presented to the subjects, are in
the Appendix.
(1) Scenario One (heparin-infusion pump-physician sce-
nario). A patient receives intravenous heparin via
an infusion pump. He is to receive a bolus for an
hour, at the end of which he is to be placed back
on the maintenance dose. A physician changes the
dose at the end of the hour. But he overlooks push-
ing the ‘‘conﬁrm’’ button for the dose change, and
the patient continues to receive the high bolus dose.
The pump keeps beeping as an indicator something
is wrong, but no one notices or pays attention to it,
including a member of the patients family who was
in the room overnight. A nurse discovers the error
the next morning.
(2) Scenario Two (oxygen-ventilator-ICU team sce-
nario). In a pediatric ICU setting, an infant receives
oxygen through a ventilator. A physician orders a
change in the ﬂowrate from one to one point ﬁve.
Neither he nor the rest of the critical care team are
aware of the fact that the device can only be put
on discrete settings of one, two, three, etc. and does
not operate when the dial is between these numbers.
Consequently the child receives no oxygen at all. On
discovering the error the child is given higher ﬂow
rates and rescued.
(3) Scenario Three (nitroglycerine-infusion pump-nurse
scenario). The condition of a patient in the ICU is
deteriorating, and multiple interventions are being
performed at the same time. The nurse receives
four drug orders in one measuring unit, and a ﬁfth
order for nitroglycerine infusion in another unit of
dosage. She ends up programming the nitroglycerineinfusion pump with a dosage in units similar to the
other four orders. The patient gets overdosed and
experiences a dangerous fall in blood pressure.3.3. Procedure
All nine subjects were asked to read Scenario One
and then to answer a set of semi-structured questions de-
signed to elicit a think-aloud protocol. Our aim was to
obtain their assessment of the causes and severity of
the error in the scenario. The same procedure was re-
peated for Scenarios Two and Three. The rationale for
the questions and probes are discussed below. All sub-
jects were interviewed face-to-face, except for the two
administrators, who were interviewed over the phone.
All interviews were audiotaped and then transcribed
for analysis.
Questions and rationale:
(1) Please provide a summary of the scenario. This ques-
tion was asked to assess the accuracy of the partici-
pants representation of the problem. This question
also provided the link between the internal represen-
tation of the problem and the decision-making pro-
cess that would be evoked by the following
questions [22–24].
(2) What are the causes of the error in the scenario? This
was asked to assess the participants perception of
the source of the error, without prompting them to
identify a human component.
(3) Please rank the causes given in (2) above on a scale of
one to ﬁve, ﬁve being the most serious and one being
the least serious. This question was asked to assess
the participants perception of the relative serious-
ness of various causes.
(4) Who (or what) do you think was responsible for these
errors? This question was asked to assess the partic-
ipants perception of the human component (and
attribution) of the error.
(5) What steps could be taken to prevent these errors?
This was asked to assess the subjects perception of
potential safeguards.
The transcribed responses were analyzed using the-
matic coding [25]. Thematic coding gives rise to catego-
ries that are not predeﬁned, but emerge in the course of
data analysis and are thus data-driven. This is similar to
the grounded theory approach to data analysis [26]. In
such a framework, the researcher approaches data with-
out a precisely stated hypothesis, allowing a theory to
emerge from the data itself, under the assumption that
the theory is grounded in the data (thus the term
grounded theory). This research approach is appropriate
for the investigation of complex topics in their natural-
istic contexts and is concerned with ‘‘understanding
behavior from the subjects own frame of reference’’
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protocols were parsed into meaningful segments, where
they represented one causal or explanatory statement
thatconsisted of a sentence clause, a sentence, or, in
some cases, the grouping of a main sentence and one
or two follow-up sentences. The iterative coding process
was a combination of inductive/‘‘bottom-up’’ and
deductive/‘‘top-down’’ coding. Some preliminary cod-
ing categories (typically, top-level) were based on the
interview questions and study objectives. Other, lower-
level categories emerged in the process of three rounds
of careful data review by three investigators, with the
ﬁrst two rounds being performed individually and the
last round being performed by all three of the investiga-
tors to reduce variability. Once ﬁnal coding categories
were developed, they were grouped and organized by
the same investigators. The thematic categories identi-
ﬁed in the three scenarios are shown below. Each of
these categories represents an event, a series of events,
possible interventions, or discrete factors that contrib-
uted to the error. For example, the environment cate-
gory is an important factor identiﬁed by the subjects
as contributing to error and shall be discussed in detail
later. We considered the working deﬁnition of a health
care event to be a planned action or a group of related
planned actions in health care. Thus an error could
also be similarly and broadly deﬁned as an event or a
series of events whose end outcomes are unacceptable
and unintended. This is similar to Reasons working
deﬁnition of error [13]:‘‘Error will be taken as a generic term to encompass all
those occasions in which a planned sequence of mental
or physical activities fails to achieve its intended out-
come, and when these failures cannot be attributed to
the intervention of some chance agency’’.Table 1
Table 1 provides the categories identiﬁed by each subject and a brief descrip
Category Description
User error Included the recognition of an ina
cognitive errors like lapses in mem
Order format and interpretation Some of the subjects identiﬁed th
diﬀerence on how the order is und
Device design ﬂaw
Device acquisition The presence of devices whose fea
Device evaluation
Environment
Device setup The nature of the environment th
the way devices are arranged andLabeling of devices
Training The subjects commented upon the
Absence of double-checking The subjects identiﬁed this catego
the concerned professional would
were working ﬁne and the orders
Communication The subjects identiﬁed the gaps in
the purchasers or evaluators of th
Family This category was speciﬁc to Scen
Each category refers to an event, possible intervention or any contributing f4. Results
The ﬁnal categories and a brief explanation of their
context as identiﬁed through our coding scheme for all
the three scenarios are shown in Table 1.
Table 2 presents the frequency of categories identiﬁed
by each subject for each scenario expressed as a percent-
age of the total number of categories of events identiﬁed
by all the subjects per scenario. The table shows that in
two out of the three scenarios the expert physician iden-
tiﬁed most categories of events (in Scenario One 88.9%,
in Scenario Two 54.6%). A nurse identiﬁed most catego-
ries in the third scenario (66.7%). However across all
scenarios, nurses show the highest mean performance
in identifying the diﬀerent categories (Mean = 60.3%).
Table 2 also presents the mean percent of categories
identiﬁed by the subjects represented as a function of
the sharp and blunt ends of health care. Amongst the nine
subjects interviewed, the physician, the resident, the phy-
sicians assistant, and the two nurses could be said to rep-
resent the sharp end, while the two biomedical engineers
and the two administrators could be said to represent
the blunt end of health care. As shown in the ﬁgure, the
subjects at the sharp end of practice identiﬁed 62.2% of
event categories in Scenario One, 38.1% in Scenario
Two, and 43.3% in Scenario Three. The subjects at the
blunt end of the practice identiﬁed 38.9% of event catego-
ries in ScenarioOne, 29.6% in ScenarioTwo, and 35.4% in
Scenario Three. The personnel at the sharp end of the
healthcare practice were able to identify signiﬁcantly
higher number of errors than the people at the blunt end
of the practice, across all three diﬀerent scenarios.
We analyzed each scenario and identiﬁed a series of is-
sues to be considered in error evaluation. We now discuss
the perception of the subjects relative to these issues.tion of their meaning
ppropriate user, lack of knowledge regarding the device involved,
ory, misinterpretation of the order, etc
at the way the order is presented in terms of dosage could make a
erstood
tures where unsatisfactory, was traced to one of these three processes
at leads to multi tasking on part of the health professionals,
setup was also identiﬁed
presence or absence of training required to use the devices
ry across the three scenarios; referring to the process by which
check to see if the patient was doing well, the devices involved
were carried out correctly
communication between the health care team and/or
e concerned device
ario One, where the family is explicitly mentioned
actor to the error that occurred in each scenario.
Table 2
The frequency of categories identiﬁed by each subject for each scenario expressed as a percentage of the total number of categories identiﬁed by all
the subjects
Subjects Scenario 1% (Total categories
identiﬁed = 9)
Scenario 2% (Total categories
identiﬁed = 11)
Scenario 3% (Total categories
identiﬁed = 12)
Nurse 1 77.8 36.4 66.7
Physician 88.9 54.6 25
Resident 55.6 36.4 50
Nurse 2 55.6 36.4 41.7
Physicians assistant 33.3 Sharp end mean = 62.2 27.3 Sharp end mean = 38.1 33.3 Sharp end mean = 43.3
Administrator 2 44.4 45.5 41.7
Biomedical engineer 2 44.4 36.4 25
Administrator 1 33.3 18.2 33.3
Biomedical engineer 1 33.3 Blunt end mean = 38.9 18.2 Blunt end mean = 29.6 41.7 Blunt end mean = 35.4
Each category refers to an event, possible intervention or any contributing factor to the error that occurred in the scenario. The mean percentage of
categories identiﬁed by the subjects, represented as a function of the sharp and blunt ends of the task is also included in the table.
A. Laxmisan et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 38 (2005) 200–212 2054.1. Scenario One: heparin-infusion pump-physician
scenarioThe task involved: Changing the dose of a drug.
Device involved: Infusion pump.
Drug: Heparin, an anti-coagulant.
Subgoals and their failures:
1. Ordering the change.
2. Communicating the order.
3. Documenting the order.
4. Performing the change ordered.
5. Verifying ‘‘right drug, right dose, right order, and
right patient.’’
6. Programming the pump.
7. Pressing conﬁrm (not done).
8. Documenting the performance.
The setting:
1. A physician operated the pump.
2. Neither he nor the nurses noticed the error.
3. The pump alarm was on all night.
4. Even the family did not notice the error.
The perceptions of the subjects:
The obvious error—the failure of the physician to
press the conﬁrm button—was noticed by all of the sub-
jects. The resident and one of the nurses mentioned that
the physician was an inappropriate user. This observa-
tion probably reﬂects those users experience or may
even be an instance of hindsight bias, as it is not un-
known for members of a health care team higher up in
the hierarchical ladder, like a physician, to perform
some of the duties of other staﬀ, especially in emergency
situations. The expert physician was the only person
who identiﬁed that the erring physician failed to notice
the need to press conﬁrm button. While all of the sub-
jects at the sharp end, except the physicians assistant,noticed that there was no communication between the
erring physician and the nurses, only one of the admin-
istrators at the blunt end noticed this. The expert physi-
cian and a nurse noticed that the way the order was
formatted in terms of drug dosage could have obviated.
This in turn reﬂects the experts superior clinical knowl-
edge and its practical application. Both the clinicians (a
physician, a resident, and a physicians assistant) and the
biomedical engineer suggested that the pump in question
itself might have been ﬂawed since the alarm went unno-
ticed all night and it continued to provide the bolus dose
even during the alarm. Only the biomedical engineer rec-
ognized that the device should have been evaluated
more closely with respect to the alarm and the need to
press the conﬁrm button. These results were surprising
since we expected that the administrators and the bio-
medical engineers would notice this. These professionals
represent the major decision makers in the purchase of
biomedical equipment. The nurses, who traditionally
have the most interaction with family members, held
that the role of the family was not signiﬁcant in this case.
This probably reﬂects their experience with family mem-
bers who would not recognize the signiﬁcance of the
alarm. The expert physician did not consider training
to be a signiﬁcant factor in this case and would expect
errors to occur in these circumstances, while other sub-
jects believed that training would have helped to prevent
them.
4.2. Scenario Two: oxygen-ventilator-ICU team scenario
The task involved: Providing an infant with oxygen.
Device involved: Ventilator.
Drug: Oxygen inhalation.
Subgoals and their failures:
1. Ordering the oxygen.
2. Communicating the order.
3. Documenting the order.
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5. Verifying ‘‘right drug, right dose, right order, and
right patient.’’
6. Operating the ventilator knob (error in using contin-
uous values instead of discrete ones).
7. Documenting the performance.
The setting:
1. Critically ill infant that rapidly became hypoxic when
the knob was set at 1.5.
2. The knob moved smoothly.
3. No one on the team knew or communicated the fact
that a continuous setting was not possible with that
particular pump.
4. The feasibility of such a ventilator in a pediatric set-
ting was questionable.
The perceptions of the subjects:
Every subject felt that the error in this scenario was
due to the lack of training or in-servicing the equip-
ment, since no one on the critical care team seemed to
know speciﬁcs about the device control. The obvious
device design ﬂaw was noticed by most of the clinicians
(4 out or 5, or 80%) but neither administrator. In addi-
tion, four of the six clinicians stated that the device
should have been removed. Two administrators and a
resident felt that lack of communication between the
biomedical engineering team and the clinical team was
responsible for the error. The physician traced the
errors to the lack of knowledge about the device that
led to a poorly formatted order, saying that if the order
had been given in a diﬀerent dose at diﬀerent intervals,
it would have had the same therapeutic eﬀect without
providing an opportunity for error. The two biomedical
engineers acknowledged the lack of an appropriate
evaluation before the device was introduced into the
clinical setting, a response consistent to their area of
expertise. The nurse, given her task of working with
the pump daily in practice, suggested placing a warning
label on the pump that would alert users to likely errors
in operation.
4.3. Scenario Three: nitroglycerine-infusion pump-nurse
scenario
The task involved: Changing the dose of a drug.
Device involved: Infusion pump.
Drug: Nitroglycerine, an antihypertensive.
Subgoals and their failures:
1. Ordering the change.
2. Communicating the order.
3. Documenting the order.
4. Performing the change ordered.5. Verifying ‘‘right drug, right dose, right order, and right
patient’’ (the error was giving the wrong dose of the
drug).
6. Programming the pump—(the error could have
occurred while the pump was being programmed).
7. Documenting the performance.
The setting:
1. Critically ill patient, multiple interventions being
performed.
2. Nurse receives voice orders and is to perform ﬁve
medication changes, of which four drugs are in a dif-
ferent unit than the nitroglycerine.
3. The device is not easily accessible.
The perceptions of the subjects:
Every subject with the exception of the administrator
identiﬁed the user error in programming the wrong dose
for the pump. Most of the subjects (8 out of 9) identiﬁed
the role of the environment in the error. They believed
that the dynamic environment, which required multi-
tasking on the part of the nurse, contributed to her er-
ror. They also believed that the way in which the
order was written and the variability with which the
drugs were ordered could have played a part in the er-
ror. The administrators went on to say that the nurse
did not check against these written orders. However,
they failed to identify the fact that nitroglycerine given
in as high a dose as described in the scenario would have
caused a sharp fall of blood pressure in a manner of
minutes, while interventions were still being performed
on the patient. This reﬂects the administrators lack of
clinical expertise in evaluating the scenario. The only
other person who identiﬁed this category was a nurse
who was referring to the absence of a more synchronous
double-checking by the other members of the team.5. Discussion
We interpreted the results within the theoretical
framework of distributed cognition. Below we discuss
the nature of expertise and of the task in relation to
the domain in question.
5.1. The ‘‘Pipe and Filter’’ analogy
It is a common human tendency to look for a scape-
goat, and often the personnel at the sharp end bear the
brunt of the blame. Cook and Woods [16] identify four
reasons why human operators are blamed for adverse
outcomes. The ﬁrst reason is the availability of human
operators; they are visible and formally responsible with
the safe functioning of the system under their charge.
The second reason is the diﬃculty in retracing or
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tem failure. Eventually this chain will include a human
whose actions will seem inappropriate in hindsight. In
absence of adequate knowledge on how these human
operators think, any analysis would fail to demonstrate
the rationale and the perspective behind the seemingly
causative human action. The third reason that Cook
and Woods mention is that the judgment of human er-
ror is made in situations where humans usually show
an exemplary performance. Failure of such systems is
rare, even in the presence of ample opportunity for er-
ror, because expert human performance is able to avert
such errors. As the performance of the human operators
improves after the inception of the system, there arises
the possibility to attribute the resultant improved system
performance to the system itself rather than to the hu-
man operators. The fourth reason for identifying human
error as a verdict, according to Cook and Woods, is the
phenomenon of hindsight bias, which is the tendency of
people to ‘‘consistently exaggerate what could have been
anticipated in foresight’’ [28]. Accordingly critics will
not be able to make unbiased judgments because of their
prior knowledge of the outcome. Cook and Woods [16]
go on to mention ‘‘hindsight bias is the greatest obstacle
to evaluating the performance of humans in complex
systems after bad outcomes.’’
This paper takes the above arguments into consider-
ation and looks beyond the allocation of blame. Cole
and Engstrom [29] suggest that the natural unit of anal-
ysis for the study of human behavior is an activity sys-
tem, comprising relations among individuals and their
proximal, ‘‘culturally organized environments.’’ A sys-Fig. 1. (A) The sieve analogy. Information ﬂows across the health care syst
system (the pipe); the block arrows represent the ﬂow of health care, while the
well as time. (B) A representation of the cross section of the pipe, which shows
However, this cross section may also be redrawn—a web instead of the triad c
more theoretically adequate diagram can be used to represent distributed cotem that consists of individuals, groups of individuals,
and technologies can be construed as a single indivisible
unit of analysis. A system is thus an intangible abstract
entity, yet it is very real and often needs to be addressed
as such. For the purpose of looking beyond human and
device factors, we required a framework to understand
the system in consideration. For this purpose, we con-
structed an analogy to help us interpret our results.
Consider the sequence of events that happen to a pa-
tient after the person seeks health care [30,31]. These
events form the ﬂow of health care, which can be as-
sumed to be smooth under normal conditions. This ﬂow
has a direction, ideally towards the goal of health, and is
contained in a pipe that represents the health care sys-
tem. If the conditions are emergent, then the ﬂow itself
is turbulent and this turbulence depends on a constant
that represents many factors like the capacity of the pipe
(the health care system), the nature of the care required
(for example, critical care), and environmental con-
straints (like a limited number of trained personnel or
limited technology). This is illustrated in Fig. 1. At
any point in time, a cross-section of the pipe represents
an event of health care in progress. An examination of
the cross section will reveal the event and the distributed
cognitive eﬀort behind the event. The ﬂow of health care
also has a relation to the ﬂow of information. Informa-
tion ﬂows across the healthcare system a long time, as
well as across people and the artifacts included in any
single event. This analogy can be extended further.
The wall of the pipe that constitutes the system does
not merely have a single layer. In fact it can be described
as having a deﬁnite structure. The clinical team thatem in two or more dimensions. This ﬁgure represents the health care
line across represents a single dimension of the ﬂow of information, as
a cognitive perspective of an event based upon Roths Cognitive Triad.
an accommodate Bergs socio-technical approach. A more complex, yet
gnition across diﬀerent agents, tools or artifacts.
208 A. Laxmisan et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 38 (2005) 200–212constitutes the sharp end lines the innermost layer as do
the devices and other non-human agents, while other
personnel like the managers, administrators, insurance
companies, and biomedical engineers from the blunt
end form the outer layers. Abstract constructs like
health care policies, economic policies, laws, and regula-
tions pervade the outer layers and modulate their activ-
ity, which further aﬀects the activities at the inner layer.
The activities of the inner layer are aﬀected in turn by
abstract concepts like medical ethics, clinical protocols,
and guidelines.
Every cross-section of the pipe is like a snapshot in
time and shows a health care event in progress. This
model can accommodate Roths cognitive triad, Bergs
socio-technical approach, and Hutchinss concept of dis-
tributed cognition [32,33]. This is illustrated in Fig. 2.
The concept applied depends on the context of the event
being analyzed. For example, Roths triad that focuses
on the individual could adequately explain the actions
of a physician entering orders using an order-entry sys-
tem but would not be adequate to describe the interac-
tion of a clinical team with a number of devices used
on a patient simultaneously [34]. The latter situation
could be explained within the broader concept of distrib-
uted and collaborative cognition.
A discernible diﬀerence in health care quality occurs
after every event, which is represented by a cross section
of the pipe. An error is at the simplest level just an event,
a single cross section of the pipe. The diﬀerence between
an error and an event is that the quality of care passing
through the pipe is altered by the error. A ﬁlter (similar
to a water ﬁlter) represents an event that corrects for the
quality of the health care ﬂowing through it, if a previ-
ous event has either not occurred or has occurred with
an unacceptable result. Health care is riddled with suchFig. 2. A representation of the cross-section of the ‘‘pipe,’’ which shows a cog
The vertices represent important agents in the event, and as the number of th
also increase.ﬁlters, often in sequence. For example, a physician calls
back to check if the order was carried out, or a nurse
checks against the written order after a shift change. It
has been shown that even experts commit errors almost
as frequently as novices, yet they correct themselves
more frequently and accurately [35]. Therefore, it may
not be far-fetched to say that even while an eﬀort may
be made to avoid an error, an equal eﬀort could be made
to catch the error.
By using this analogy of the pipe and the ﬁlters, an
event that leads to an error can be identiﬁed by examin-
ing the quality of care before and after each event. The
faulty ﬁlters (or screens) behind the event can be identi-
ﬁed with respect to the frequency as well as temporality
of their occurrences. An example of a ﬁlter is a nurse
checking orders soon after she signs in for her shift.
But if the event that leads to an error happens after
she has checked her orders, the ﬁlter can be said to have
let the error through (missed the error) and is thus
faulty. These ﬁlters can be considered similar to a sche-
ma where prior conception is used to screen irrelevant
information in problem-solving tasks [36]. These sche-
mata develop as a function of expertise.
5.2. Application of the ﬁlter analogy to the perception of
events and errors
Table 3 shows a sample of the data interpreted within
the context of the ﬁlter analogy. The two columns at the
extreme right represent the added inferences with respect
to whether a ﬁlter was identiﬁed and the frequency with
which a particular ﬁlter was identiﬁed. The events were
analyzed by comparing the table with the original seg-
mented transcript. We identiﬁed the ﬁlters using the fol-
lowing criteria.nitive view of an ‘‘event’’ based on the theories of distributed cognition.
ese vertices increase the number of possible interactions between them
Table 3
A sample of the data reexamined with the ﬁlter analogy interpretation
Error identiﬁed (broad category) Error identiﬁed (speciﬁc category) Frequency Filter Failure Count
User Error Failure to hit conﬁrm 1
User Error Failure to notice conﬁrmation required 2 Y 1
Order Format Delivery 1
Communication Communication with family 1
User Error Inattention 3
Order Format Delivery 2
Device design ﬂaw Conﬁrmation needs to be done (clearer) 1 Y 1
Training Recognizes error occurrence even with training 1
Device design ﬂaw Needs to be louder 2
User Error Bad use 4
Device design ﬂaw Alarm 3 2
Environment Task overload/multitasking 1
Non speciﬁc 1
Family Role is important 1
Order Format Delivery 3
Absence of double checking Absence of double checking 1 Y 1
The last two columns represent the added inferences with respect to whether a ﬁlter was identiﬁed, and the frequency with which it was mentioned.
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health care event (e.g., a nurse checking on a patient,
or a surgeon asking for an instrument count before he
closes an incision).
2. A ﬁlter could follow the occurrence of an error,
which could be an error of omission or an error of
commission (e.g., a physician who forgets to per-
form part of a routine physical examination, realizes
the fact when he reads his notes, and performs the
necessary test).
3. A ﬁlter may precede the event if the ﬁlter itself con-
stitutes an important event in quality control (e.g.,
a nurse checks to see that the medicine contained
in the storage cabinet has reached its expiration
date).
We identiﬁed four ﬁlters in Scenario One:
(1) Failure to recognize conﬁrmation. The physician rec-
ognized that the erring physician in the scenario not
only failed to complete the required action (by fail-
ing to press the conﬁrm button), but also failed to
notice that conﬁrmation was required. This was
the unique ﬁlter that the other personnel missed.
(2) Device design ﬂaw. Three out of the nine subjects
(the physician, a nurse, and the physicians assistant)
recognized the device ﬂaw (an inadequate alarm).
They also identiﬁed that the need for conﬁrmation
after performing an action was unclear.
(3) Absence of double-checking. By far, this was the most
common ﬁlter identiﬁed, by eight out of the nine
subjects, where the nurse failed to check on the
patient and the orders.
(4) Evaluation of the devices. This ﬁlter, identiﬁed by one
of the biomedical engineers, refers to the process of
evaluation of a device before it is introduced to theclinical environment. This is considered a ﬁlter
because as the process corrects for the inherent
device errors that should have been caught by the
biomedical engineers who conducted the evaluation.
This is an instance of an expert recognizing a rele-
vant error in his/her area of expertise.
We identiﬁed four ﬁlters in Scenario Two:
(1) Training. Every subject identiﬁed this ﬁlter, with
each mentioning that none of the players in the sce-
nario knew about the peculiarity of the device in
that it allowed only discrete volumes. They all attrib-
uted this to the lack of training.
(2) Order format. The physician identiﬁed as a problem
the decision to deliver that particular dosage in
absence of knowledge of how the device worked,
which was an error. The physician also noticed that,
in this particular scenario, the error was recognized
before an adverse event occurred (a near-miss).
(3) Device acquisition. The physician and one of the bio-
medical engineers described this ﬁlter, which refers
to the actual process of acquiring a device for future
use by the hospital. The physician held that the pres-
ence of such a device in a pediatric ICU made no
sense.
(4) Evaluation of the devices. As in the scenario above,
the same biomedical engineer identiﬁed that the
inherent device errors should have been caught dur-
ing the evaluation of the device. This engineer possi-
bly identiﬁes this ﬁlter more than once as it has
direct relation to that individuals current work,
which involves direct contact with the users during
evaluation and maintenance of equipment.
We identiﬁed three ﬁlters in Scenario Three:
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the subjects. But there was wide variability in what
they understood within this context. The personnel
at the sharp end and one of the biomedical engineers
held that the variability in ordering the drug dosage
(in terms of the units of the drug) could allow for
such an error to happen and that this could have
been avoiding by formatting the order in a more
understandable form. The administrators, however,
held that the order should have been in the written
form, in contrast to the verbal form as stated in
the scenario, to prevent the error.
(2) Absence of double-checking. Three subjects—a nurse
and the two administrators—identiﬁed this ﬁlter.
The two administrators held that the nurse did not
double-check on her orders, which would have
required the orders to be in writing. The nurse, how-
ever, referred to double-checking the actions of the
erring nurse at the time that the error occurred, a
more dynamic check that could have carried out
by any other member of the health care team.
(3) Device design. A nurse and two biomedical engineers
mentioned that the presence of inbuilt constraints or
the necessity for standardized input could have pre-
vented such an error by not allowing the erring
nurse to input a wrong dose.
At this juncture, we should point out the diﬀerent
interpretation of Scenario Three by the administrators.
In this scenario, the dose of nitroglycerine that was
administered by the erring nurse was extremely high.
Nitroglycerine, especially when given intravenously, is
a fast-acting drug. Therefore the eﬀects of the error
would have been immediate, with no time available for
the order to be written or checked against the order.
The administrators however held that the error occurred
because the order was not written down and the nurse
did not check her actions against the written order. This
reﬂects their poor understanding of the clinical circum-
stances of this scenario. The ﬁlters that the administra-
tors identiﬁed, which were the double-checking on part
of the nurse against the written orders of the physician,
reﬂect the traditional expectations that administrators
would have of the clinicians.
As mentioned earlier, the pipe and ﬁlter analogy is
based on the cognitive concept that experts are able to
correct themselves in time by being able to identify crit-
ical points or events that would lead to an error. This
concept is considered valid given that the data show
there are diﬀerences among the expert physician, resi-
dent, and physicians assistant respectively as a function
of expertise development. Using this analogy concept as
a qualitative tool, we can now say with more conﬁdence
that the clinical personnel at the sharp end had a better
representation for making accurate decisions about crit-
ical events than the administrative or engineering per-sonnel. The results emphasize the diﬀerence between
two groups of health care professionals, those at the
sharp end and those at the blunt end of health care prac-
tice. The apparent gap in clinical insight on the part of
the blunt end might reﬂect the poor understanding of
the blunt end personnel regarding the practical issues
that are encountered in the clinical environment. The
importance of this gap lies not only in evaluating error,
but also in broader issues such as the purchasing of bio-
medical equipment, and the introduction of electronic
tools and other applications that can result in a major
change in workﬂow [17]. This gap in insight can be as-
cribed to a lack of situational awareness, which is the
absence of awareness of things that are happening in a
particular situation (such as clinical practice) and the
reasons for their occurrence [5,37]. This lack of situa-
tional awareness is shown by the two administrators as
discussed above.
The pipe analogy also suggests the importance of col-
laborative cognition in the health care environment [18–
20]. The subjects in the study consistently identiﬁed
events that require eﬀective communication, teamwork,
and a workload distribution. They also identiﬁed the
importance of the role of the team players. For example,
in one scenario, the subjects identiﬁed that it was inap-
propriate on the physicians part to have handled the
infusion pump, a task that is traditionally carried out
by the nurses in most settings. In clinical settings it is
not uncommon to see instances where the often-indis-
tinct lines that deﬁne the roles of each team player blur.
But most situations in which such transgressions occur
and are acceptable are when a player at a higher level
in the hierarchy performs a task usually intended to be
carried out by a person lower down in the hierarchy,
as in the scenario presented to the subjects. Thus, in
the absence of the occurrence of the error, such an event
would not have been identiﬁed as abnormal. It is only in
retrospect and probably due to hindsight that this
seemed important to them. We argue that even though
such an observation can be attributed to hindsight bias,
it does not diminish the importance of the observation.
As mentioned earlier it may be possible that the physi-
cian did not have adequate training or exposure to such
pumps. A possible acceptable alternative action that the
physician could have adopted in the scenario was to
eﬀectively communicate the change in orders to the
nursing staﬀ, both verbally as well as in writing. To be
eﬀective, communication should also have an emotional
component. A physician could expect a better response
to his orders if he has a better rapport with his team.
Similarly, we have to identify the importance of collab-
orative cognition amongst the purchasers, evaluators,
and users of devices. Each of these groups consists of ex-
perts with diﬀering areas of expertise, which may over-
lap. They all have diﬀerent perspectives that depend
on their cognitive backgrounds with respect to their
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roles in society. It is therefore important for these
groups to reach a consensus before an important institu-
tional decision is made [17].
Critical care environments are complex and dynamic,
requiring multitasking and decisions to be made at
diﬀerent points in time. The conditions that inﬂuence
these decisions cannot always be predetermined as they
evolve with time. The pipe and ﬁlter analogy could be
applied to the analysis of errors or near misses to recon-
struct the ﬂow of events and to identify the predisposing
factors.6. Conclusion
The results show that the interpretations of the diﬀer-
ent individuals mirror their area of expertise. Because
interpretation is closely related to representation, the
representations of the problems are also diﬀerent
[1,36]. The clinicians identiﬁed critical clinical events,
and the biomedical engineers identiﬁed critical events
that pertained to devices. The administrators focused
primarily on documentation and training. Because prob-
lem representation is in turn closely related to how peo-
ple make decisions, our research raises the question as to
whether such diﬀerences between the ends of health care
may reﬂect on broader issues in institutional decision
making, like the decisions regarding the interventions
to reduce error, or the decisions regarding the purchas-
ing as well as the employment of information technol-
ogy and electronic tools.
Keeping with the current trends in the analysis of er-
rors, we move away from the focus on the human aspect
of error and its attendant allocation of blame to a single
individual to a systems approach. Using the pipe and ﬁl-
ter analogy as a theoretical framework, we reconstruct
the system involved and recognize potential areas of
intervention in the scenarios studied (ﬁlters and their
failures). We used the analogy to help us assess the com-
pleteness of the problem representations of the subjects,
their awareness of critical events, and how these events
would collectively contribute to the occurrence of error.
From this we conclude that no single individual has a
comprehensive view of all the factors that contributed
to error. Other potential uses of this concept would be
to study the systems into which medical devices, infor-
mation technology, or electronic tools are to be intro-
duced to maximize their performance and utility and
also to reduce the factors that contribute to mishaps.
To take a page from the aerospace industry, using a sys-
tems approach to error could potentially convert a
health care organization into a ‘‘high reliability organi-
zation’’—a complex, dynamic organization that carries
out its activities with a low incidence of mishaps and
an almost complete absence of catastrophes [3,38,39].Acknowledgments
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physician scenario
Around 8 pm, a patient was receiving a usual infu-
sion of heparin per the heparin protocol, around
12 cm3/min (1200 U/h). Due to a change in circum-
stances, this patient was to receive a bolus dose of
Heparin IV through the infusion pump. This bolus
was ordered to change at the end of one hour back
to the maintenance continuous dose. A physician at
the end of the hour changed the drip rate but did
not check the conﬁrm button or notice the small con-
ﬁrm print warning on the panel of the pump. The next
morning, a nurse entered the room upon hearing the
pump alarm beeping. She noted an empty bag, and
that the rate set on the pump was 200 cm3/min. The
patient had received a bolus of approximately 18,000
units of heparin. When the nurse manager investigated
the event, both nurses who were caring for this patient
overnight denied changing the pump infusion at all. Of
note, there was a patients family member in the room
the entire night, though this person was never asked di-
rectly about what might have happened to the pump.
Furthermore, the patient did not recall anyone chang-
ing the pump. Biomedical Engineering now has the
case, and is investigating the pump. Preliminary report
suggests that there was no problem with the pump but
that it was mis-programmed.
Scenario Two: oxygen-ventilator-ICU team scenario
A pediatric ICU physician was treating a six-month-
old patient with oxygen and ordered that the infant re-
ceive 1.5 L per minute. Within 3 min, the patient became
hypoxic. At this point, the critical care team increased
oxygen ﬂow to 3 L/min for 10 min to compensate and
was then ordered by the physician to be set to 2 L/
min. Biomedical engineering told the critical care team
that they set the ﬂow control knob between 1 and 2 L/
min not realizing that the scale numbers represented dis-
crete settings (0 or 1 or 2 or 3, etc.) rather than contin-
uous settings (1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, etc.). Hence, even though
the knob rotated smoothly—suggesting that intermedi-
ate settings were possible—there was no oxygen ﬂow
between the settings.
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scenario
In the ICU, a patients conditionwas deteriorating and
multiple therapeutic interventions were beingmade at the
same time. As part of this situation, ﬁve medication
changes needed to be made immediately in order to re-
verse the patients condition. The nurse, receiving voice
orders, was programming the infusion pump to adminis-
ter one dose of nitroglycerine at 10 cm3/h, and mcq/kg/
min doses of four other medications. The patient experi-
enced serious decrease in blood pressure a short while la-
ter as a result. Biomedical engineering stated that the
pump was operating adequately yet noted that the dose
of nitroglycerine programmed in was 10 mg/kg/min; they
also noted that positioning of the pump in the patients
room was awkward and not easily accessible from the
front due to other critical care equipment being in the
way. The attending physician stated that the intended
dosagewas clearlywritten in the record as being 10 cm3/h.References
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